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In 2000, the international community agreed on a set of poverty-reduction and human-development targets—the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—to be achieved by 2015. Official Development Assistance (ODA) is a 
source of funds for the developing world; however, the amount is not sufficient to cover the yearly $50 billion 
needed to meet the goals. To complement ODA, innovative financing mechanisms have been explored. Among 
others, the idea of a Tobin tax is again being debated. Another mechanism that has been tested since 1 July 2006 
is the air-ticket tax. This paper summarises the current trends in ODA and describes how these mechanisms 
work.  
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Many developing countries have made considerable progress towards eliminating poverty 
through strong economic growth over the past decade. Unfortunately, for the least 
developed countries, this has not been so. Aware of this, the international community had, in 
the year 2000, agreed on a set of goals for poverty reduction and human development for 
these countries. These Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were unanimously adopted 
by the United Nations 2000 General Assembly and were to be achieved by 2015. Some of 
the targets of the MDGs are: to halve extreme poverty (defined as $1 per person per day) 
and hunger, to provide universal access to primary education, to promote gender equality 
and empowerment of women, to improve health (by reducing child and maternal mortality), 
to combat major infectious diseases (especially HIV/AIDS and malaria), to improve 
environmental sustainability (by providing sanitation and safe drinking water), and to build 
up a global partnership for development. 
 The international community soon realised that, based on the current trends of official 
development assistance (ODA), there is a strong possibility that the MDGs will not be 
achieved by 2015, particularly in Africa. The underlying trends indicate that although 
developed economies have continued to enhance their aid efforts through commitments to 
further increase ODA, the ODA is expected to decline as a percentage of Gross National 
Income (GNI) of donor nations. In such circumstances, the financial gap between the ODA 
and the total amount needed to finance the MDGs will, in the long run, remain.  






As the attainment of the MDGs is targeted for 2015 and the trend of ODA committed by 
the developed countries is not expected to change substantially in the near future, other 
financing mechanisms for development need to be devised. These should not be considered 
as a substitute for ODA, but rather as an additional source of funds for development. 
Innovative mechanisms for financing development of the poorest countries have been 
suggested, especially in terms of global taxation. This article focuses on possible new 
complementary sources of financing, in particular the revised idea of an international 
currency transaction tax—the Tobin tax. Among other possible innovative sources of 
financing, an air-ticket tax is being tested since 1 July 2006. 
 
 
WHAT IS HAPPENING WITH ODA? 
 
Following the adoption of the MDGs in September 2000 by the international community, 
implementation of pledges by donor countries has been erratic and slow, with only one-third 
of bilateral ODA being channelled to programmes and project expenditures for the poor 
countries. The United Nations and the World Bank estimate that an increase in ODA of at 
least $50 billion by 2010 is needed. Based on current trends, it is unlikely that the agreed 
goals and target dates will be met. It was estimated that additional funding through increase 
of ODA (excluding debt relief) to 0.46% of GNI of donor countries by 2010 will be required 
(World Bank, 2006). 
Some countries have shown greater commitment than others to achieve the target. 
According to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), net ODA contributed by DAC member 
countries increased by a record $27 billion in 2005, reaching $106.5 billion. This 
represented an increase to 0.33% of GNI from a low of 0.22% in 2001. However, much of 
this increase was due to debt-relief grants, which totalled $23 billion in 2005, up from a 
mere $4 billion in 2004. This included nearly $14 billion in debt relief provided to Iraq and 
a little over $5 billion to Nigeria by their Paris Club creditors. Such debt-relief and other 
special-purpose grants accounted for 75% of the bilateral portion of ODA in 2005, well 
above the 53% average of the 1990s. Excluding debt relief, ODA increased by a modest 
8.7% in real terms, up from the average annual rate of 5.6% in 2002–04 (World Bank, 
2006). Some of the growth registered over the past years, especially in 2003, was also due to 
the dollar’s decline against the euro, the yen and the UK pound, the currencies in which 
payments by non-US donors are denominated. 
Although the total commitment to ODA appears to be increasing, the amount of 
increase is not consistent with the intended target in 2015. Some countries, such as those 
within the European Union (EU), have decided to go for higher commitments as they have 
agreed to increase their ODA contribution from 0.35% of GNI in 2004 to 0.7% of GNI by 
the 2015 target date. Other countries have not shown similar commitments. The United 
States has, in fact, announced (at the G-8 2006 Summit) that it will reduce its ODA from 
$27.5 billion in 2005 to $24 billion from 2006 to 2010 (in real terms). Its share of total ODA 
will therefore decline from 25.8% in 2005 to 18.7% in 2010 while the respective share of 
the EU will increase from 53.9% to 63.4% (Table 1). 
 
 




Table 1. Percentage Share of Donors’ ODA in 2005 and Projected 2010 
Country 2005 2005 excluding debt relief 2010 
United States 25.8 28.0* 18.7 
Japan 12.3 11.4 9.3 
United Kingdom 10.1 8.5 11.4 
France 9.4 8.2 11.0 
Germany 9.3 7.6 12.1 
Netherlands 4.8 5.7 4.0 
Italy 4.7 4.0 7.2 
Total  76.5 73.4 73.7 
EU Members as a group 53.9 49.2 63.4 
*The higher share is explained by the fact that countries other than the US contributed more to debt relief in 
2005 ($19 billion and $4 billion, respectively), causing the US’s share of the total to fall. Consequently, once the 
debt-relief figure is removed from the total, the share of the US appreciates compared to that of the other 
countries.  
Source: Projections by the OECD DAC Secretariat. 
 
 
One of the main reasons why developed donor countries are not meeting their target 
commitments to ODA is the lack of a stable source of funding to draw from. Recipient 
countries must have a regular source of funding that can enable them to cover their recurring 
developmental costs. Interruption in aid flows will strongly reduce the aid’s effectiveness. 
The traditional sources of funding for the ODA are not only inadequate but are also highly 
unpredictable, with damaging consequences for the recipient countries (see, for example, 
Ranis, 2006).  
On average, ODA volatility is four times higher than the GDP growth of the developing 
countries (Bulir and Hamann, 2001). This is due to budgetary procedures in donor countries, 
changes in priorities, and policy-making or implementation delays. As long as aid is 
conditional and mainly left to the donors’ discretion, the volatility of aid flows may be 
unavoidable. Other forms of aid, even when framed within annual or multi-year 
programmes, remain subject to the uncertainties of the donors’ own goals and priorities, 
which may change frequently with changing economic conditions. Other sources of 
volatility include shifting coordination among donors and their dialogue with recipients, 
which can often lead to unstable contributions to the ODA. 
 
 
EXPLORING INNOVATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS 
 
As additional resources will not be spontaneously made available, new mechanisms must be 
geared towards supplying stable, predictable and substantial developmental assistance to 
developing countries. The challenge is to ensure that while engaging the international 
community on new financing initiatives, these must not indirectly decrease the level of 
ODA funding in the end. In the current foreign assistance environment, some ideas are 
attracting renewed worldwide attention. A case in point is the taxation of financial 
transactions or the Tobin tax, which is being reviewed as an important tax instrument to 





The Tobin Tax Revisited 
 
In 1972, in the face of growing financial globalization, Professor James Tobin, a Nobel 
laureate at Yale University, anticipated the dangers of open currency markets and suggested 
a small tax on currency trading. The idea was formally proposed during his presidential 
address to the Eastern Economic Association in 1977 (Tobin, 1978). This, he said, was to 
“throw sand in the wheels” of the currency market so as to slow down speculation, promote 
long-term investment, and give governments greater autonomy in their monetary policy.1 
The currency transaction tax was initially proposed to be applied on a universal basis to spot 
transactions. The level of taxation was proposed to be low (around 0.01%) in order to 
minimise its effects on the market and the risk of evasion, as well as to maintain a broad 
taxable base. 
Since Tobin’s initial proposal, taxation of financial transactions has been one of the 
most debated mechanisms over the past two decades (Tourres, 2002). On every business 
day, traders at banks around the world exchange more than US$1 trillion in currencies. Less 
than 5% of these transactions are necessary to cover spot international trade, travel and 
long-term investments. The large remaining balance represents speculative and destabilizing 
activities such as speculative arbitrage, “noise trading” and high-volume speculation on 
major currency price changes. 
Foreign exchange trading totalled an average daily turnover of $1,880 billion in April 
2004 from $1,200 billion in April 2001 (Bank for International Settlements, 2005). This 
large increase in activity in traditional foreign exchange markets represents a 57% increase 
at current exchange rates and a 36% rise when volumes are measured at constant exchange 
rates. In addition to valuation effects, factors that have boosted turnover include investors’ 
interest in foreign exchange as an alternative to equity and fixed-income assets, the more 
active role of asset managers, and the growing importance of hedge funds. This trend is 
unlikely to reverse soon as the above factors are stronger than those that tend to contribute 
to a decline in currency trading activity. The latter factors include consolidation in the 
banking sector, the growth of electronic brokering, and international concentration in the 
corporate sector—all of which continue to have an impact today (Galati and Melvin, 2004).  
Given the foregoing context, the renewed attention to a financial transaction tax will not 
come as a surprise although the nature of the debate is still very animated. For its supporters, 
a tax on foreign exchange/currency transactions is technically feasible. It can be levied 
either on the trading of the transaction or on settlement. In either case, the transactions 
would have to be declared. It has been argued that tax authorities can find it difficult to 
collect such tax, especially because traders can evade the tax via the creation of non-taxable 
instruments such as special derivatives, and by using tax-free havens such as offshore 
centres to shelter their trades. But Spahn (1995, 2002) and other tax proponents have made 
convincing proposals that would block these and other avoidance schemes, by, for example, 
taxing interbank or wholesale transactions at the point of settlement and imposing a penalty 
on transactions within jurisdictions that do not impose the tax.  
 
 
                                                 
1These objectives are not under discussion here. The tax is examined only from the viewpoint of raising funds 
for development, without affecting market efficiency. 






The surge of interest in a currency transaction tax (CTT) scheme is not surprising given its 
potential to generate substantial tax revenue, and to more than offset the decline in ODA 
from OECD countries (the double-dividend argument). A number of recent studies have 
tried to assess the potential revenue that can be raised. Felix and Sau (1996) estimated 
potential global revenues from the CTT in 1995 to be between $302 billion and $393 billion 
based on a 0.25% tax, from $148 billion to $180 billion from a 0.1% tax, and from $90 
billion to $97 billion from a 0.05% tax. Using Felix and Sau’s estimates for the annual 
revenue in 1995 from a 0.05% tax on 1995 foreign currency exchange volumes, the total 
revenue obtained in various countries would have been $97.1 billion (Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2. Potential Revenue Generated from Different Countries Based on  
Felix and Sau (1996) Estimate of 1995 CTT of 0.05% 
Country US$ (Billion) 
A. INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES  
United Kingdom 28.7 










Other OECD Countries 8.1 
B. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
Singapore 6.4 
Hong Kong 5.5 
South Africa 0.3 
Bahrain 0.1 
Other Developing Countries 1.1 
  
TOTAL 97.1 
Source: Felix and Sau (1996). 
 
 
According to a more recent study by Paul and Wahlberg (2002), taxes on currency 
transactions could raise large revenues even if transaction volumes were lowered by as 
much as 50%. They estimated revenue based on various assumptions such as different tax 
rates, different impacts on trading levels, and the number of transactions that would escape 
taxation through the use of new financial instruments or tax havens. A tax of 0.2%, with a 





year, would result in an annual revenue of about $300 billion. A tax of just 0.05%, with a 
50% tax-induced reduction of transactions and non-participation by the United States and 
other major trading centres (a further 50% reduction), would still yield a hefty $38 billion. 
Different revenue figures have been projected in other studies using different 
assumptions. Using a 0.05% tax rate, Kenen (1996) estimated a tax revenue of 90–97 billion 
dollars. Spahn (2002) estimated that a 0.1% tax levied throughout the EU (including the 
UK) and Switzerland can yield 17–20 billion euros or about US$16 billion. A UN study 
(United Nations General Assembly, 2001) estimated that a universal tax at the 0.1% rate 
would yield $132 billion. 
Nissanke (2004) reviewed the estimates of potential revenues which can be derived 
from a CTT, and highlighted a few interesting results. Given the substantial changes taking 
place in market structures in the wholesale interbank segments as a result of new 
technological developments, she concluded that it is unwise to impose the higher tax rates 
suggested by Felix and Sau (1996). High tax rates of 0.1% to 1% can trigger significant 
disturbances to market liquidity in the wholesale segments, and it may be prudent to adopt a 
phase-in approach whereby markets would have time to respond gradually, and in a stable 
manner, to the introduction of a CTT. At the same time, Nissanke agreed that, based on 
calculations by Frankel (1996) and by Spahn (2002), lower tax rates could still provide 
sufficient disincentives to traders not to over-engage in noise trading. 
Using the assumption that tax rates of 0.02% and 0.01% would reduce the volume of 
wholesale transactions (excluding transactions with non-financial customers) by 15% and 
5%, respectively, Nissanke’s own calculation of potential revenue from CTTs suggested that 
a CTT at 2 basis points applied to wholesale transactions would generate an annual revenue 
of US$30–35 billion, while a CTT at 1 basis point would yield US$17–19 billion. 
However, Nissanke cautioned that, due to recent structural changes in foreign exchange 
markets and taking into consideration market efficiency, liquidity, and current technical 
feasibility, all previous revenue estimates should be revised downward. Consequently, 
although CTTs have the potential of generating between 15 and 28 billion dollars for global 
public use, such a tax on its own would not be sufficient as a complementary financing 
mechanism for development if all countries kept for their own national use 20 and 70 per 
cent, respectively, of the CTT collected. 
 
 
A Combined Solution 
 
The revenue estimates from these studies are too wide and uncertain to meet the estimated 
need to increase the ODA by $50 billion by 2010. However, the Tobin tax has merits and, as 
such, should not be abandoned as a complementary source of funding. A multi-tier system 
and/or a combination with capital controls or security tax may also be worth considering as 
a more successful solution. On this issue, Spahn (1996, 2002) contributed an important new 
element by suggesting that the tax should include a second, much-higher rate that would 
come into force whenever major speculation arises and price movements exceed a pre-
established limit. 
The minimal-rate transaction tax would function on a continuing basis and raise 
revenues without necessarily impairing the normal liquidity function of world financial 
markets. It would also serve as a monitoring and controlling device for the exchange 




surcharge, which would be administered jointly with the transaction tax. The exchange 
surcharge would function as an automatic circuit-breaker whenever speculative attacks 
against currencies occurred. As stipulated by Spahn, the two-tier tax or other dual taxation 
schemes would favour long-term investments and loans, and discourage short-term activities 
and sudden, destabilizing price changes. 
If such a dual taxation scheme is successfully administered on its own or in conjunction 
with other measures such as capital controls or security transaction tax, the potential benefits 
in double dividends from these measures would ensure substantial support and political 
feasibility for its implementation. Also, the coordinated approach would have the potential 
to curtail leakages from these policies, such as asset substitution, market migration, or tax 
evasion. 
Although many powerful forces are still opposed to taxing currency transactions, the 
movement is gaining ground as a tax instrument for global finance and as a means to raise 
developmental funds. Many who formerly opposed it unconditionally, like the IMF and the 
Bank for International Settlements, have now admitted that it may have some merits. This 
movement for a CTT is aided by a renewed sense of urgency to attain the targets of the 
MDGs by the year 2015. 
 
 
THE AIR-TICKET TAX: AN ALTERNATIVE TO GLOBAL TAX 
 
In view of the substantial financial gap to be filled, some countries have taken the lead to 
move one step further. With the support of the UN Secretary General, countries like Brazil, 
Chile, France, Spain, Germany and Algeria have subscribed to the 2004 Geneva Declaration 
which led to the establishment of a Technical Group with the mandate to explore new and 
innovative financing mechanisms to meet the targets of the MDGs (Technical Group, 2004). 
The principle of innovative sources of financing for development of poor countries is 
now receiving support from a large part of the international community. On 14 September 
2005, during the Summit on Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals in New 
York, another ambitious declaration on innovative sources of financing and international 
solidarity contributions, co-sponsored by the members of the Group of Six, was supported 
by 79 countries. The signatories include several European countries (Germany, UK, Spain, 
Estonia, Austria, Sweden, Luxembourg) and major emerging countries (Brazil, India). 
Developing countries have shown high expectations for this initiative: 28 of the 47 African 
countries supported the declaration and it was favourably received by five others. 
Aside from the tax on international transactions, several other proposals for innovative 
financing mechanisms for development are under various stages of study. Some of the more 
important tax proposals are based on creating disincentives and thus, are referred to as 
“Pigovian” tax (environmental tax, international transaction tax).2 While most of these new 
innovative financing mechanisms are still being debated, the air-ticket tax idea has been 
implemented since 1 July 2006.  
 
                                                 
2The desired effect of this tax is to bring private costs in line with the social cost, thus internalising the 
externality. The tax forces the players to take account of the whole social cost when making their decisions. As 





The First International Solidarity Levy: The Air-Ticket Tax 
 
Some general and specific taxes on certain modes of transportation (such as road and rail) 
are designed to reduce fuel consumption and, at least in part, to internalise their negative 
effects on the environment. Their emissions are also included in the Kyoto emissions 
quotas. The aviation and shipping sectors, however, are exempted from the Kyoto 
Agreement, the argument being that their international character goes beyond the reach of 
national sovereignty. This does not mean, however, that it is technically impossible to 
envisage some form of taxation. 
Air transport is one of the industries that has benefited most from globalization, making 
it legitimate for the sector to contribute to efforts to assist poorer countries left behind by 
globalization. Indeed, air transport has experienced a long period of rapid expansion. Global 
traffic has grown by 8% annually since 1960 in value terms, and its volume is forecast to 
grow by 5% between now and 2015 (Landau, 2004). The growth in intercontinental flights 
is especially pronounced and in recent years this growth has been primarily in the first- and 
business-class passenger segments, which on average represent two-thirds of airline 
revenues. Air transportation is also a source of significant environmental damage, which has 
a high social cost—estimated at 32 billion euros a year for the EU alone. This damage 
includes local pollution in the form of air and noise pollution near airports, and global 
pollution from the emission of carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas. 
Several countries have introduced low taxes that partially compensate for local 
pollution. However, where global pollution is concerned, air transport falls outside the 
Kyoto protocol. To balance this shortcoming, there are three possible ways to tax aviation-
related pollution: first, a tax on kerosene consumed; second, taxing the use of air corridors; 
and, third, direct taxation of tickets. According to the Landau report (2004), a worldwide tax 
of the first two categories are estimated to yield around $10 billion. As a rough guide, these 
taxes would add nearly 20% to the cost of kerosene, and the average price of a ticket would 
rise by approximately 2.5%. In the third category, a 5% tax on first- and business-class 
tickets would yield approximately $8 billion. 
A group of pioneering countries have implemented the air-ticket tax, also called the air-
ticket solidarity contribution. They were led by Germany and France who started applying 
this air-ticket contribution on 1 July 2006 in the form of an increased civil-aviation tax for 
airline passengers. The French law, which was approved by the French Parliament on 22 
December 2005, sets out the rate caps for all flights departing from French territory.3 Rate 
caps are differentiated according to the flight destination and travel class, and the actual 
rates were finalised by a 2006 decree. For domestic flights or intra-European flights (EU 
including Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway), the capped rate is 1 euro per passenger in 
economy class and 10 euros in first and business classes. On non-domestic or outbound EU 
flights, rates will be four times higher. These capped rates are expected to generate revenues 
of up to 200 million euros per year. 
The supporters of this tax highlight three key points, namely, that it is easy to 
implement, flexible and fair, and has limited economic impact. The mechanism is easy to 
implement by raising existing airport taxes and charges. Collection costs are minimal and 
                                                 
3This law exempts passengers on connecting flights, e.g., all those with less than 12 hours between the scheduled 
arrival time at a French airport and the scheduled departure time from the same airport. 




national tax sovereignty is not affected. Internationally, differentiation between rates makes 
it possible to consider the specific characteristics of all countries implementing this 
contribution, especially their level of development. One other advantage is that it can be 
implemented without waiting for global participation by all countries. 
The air-ticket tax is progressive since higher rates are applied to passengers travelling in 
first or business class. At an international level, the tax will be implemented by countries of 
both North and South. However, rates can be differentiated according to the level of 
development of the participating countries. Chile will levy a contribution of 4 euros on 
international flights only, half of which will be allocated to the promotion of tourism and 
half to development. Countries with larger surface area will not be penalised since different 
rates can be applied to domestic and international flights, as in Chile. 
The air-ticket contribution will not trigger any distortion in competition between airline 
companies because it is based on territorial aspects rather than nationality. All airline 
companies, regardless of nationality, will have to levy the solidarity contribution when one 
of their airplanes departs from an airport located in a participating country. Even with a 
limited number of participating countries, the air-ticket contribution does not result in any 
rerouting of traffic. Exemption of passengers on connecting flights ensures that airports 
located in participating countries will not be penalised. Also, countries generating large 
revenues from tourism will not be penalised: the air-ticket contribution is very low 
compared to the average total cost of a holiday. 
Following the French proposition, the participating countries have decided that part of 
the revenue generated from the air-ticket contribution can be channelled to help achieve the 
MDGs by 2015, especially its goal of fighting pandemics in developing countries via an 
International Drug Purchasing Facility (IDPF).4 One objective could be to facilitate access 
to HIV/AIDS treatment by assuring the long-term production of anti-retroviral drugs, which 
are presently available to only about 1 million of the 6.5 million people who need them 
immediately. 
The support for an air-ticket tax is growing very fast. At the Brasilia conference held on 
6 and 7 July 2006, only five months after the Paris conference in which 13 countries set the 
tone for this tax, six additional nations have joined the movement (Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3. Countries Implementing the Air-ticket Tax 
Pioneer countries New countries 
France Jordan Cambodia 
Chile Luxembourg Guinea 
Brazil Madagascar Gabon 
United Kingdom Mauritius Guatemala 
Congo Nicaragua Mali 
Ivory Coast Norway South Korea 
Cyprus   
 
 
                                                 





Although the future of the tax seems promising as one of the complementary financing 
mechanisms for the MDGs, the lack of political will by other major industrial economies to 
implement the air-ticket tax will lead at this point only to modest additional revenues for the 
achievement of the MDGs. Further, although the decision to channel the tax revenue into an 
IDPF is firmly set, the Brasilia conference in July 2006 showed that the scope of the facility 





The purpose of this article is to describe two innovative financing mechanisms to reduce the 
gap between the amounts required and available to meet the MDGs. The Tobin tax has been 
considered for its revenue potential and no longer solely as a currency transaction tax to 
combat financial volatility. Attention has also been paid to the air-ticket tax which is a 
totally new financing mechanism for development. The Tobin tax has not yet been 
implemented, whereas the air-ticket tax has. A comparison of these two ways of funding the 
MDGs permits one to draw a few conclusions. 
First, the political economy surrounding the chosen innovative financing mechanism 
plays an important role. As such, the degree to which the taxpayers accept the objective for 
which the taxes are raised influence their ultimate acceptance. The Tobin tax remains 
associated with currency volatility and consequently with curbing speculation. It has a better 
chance to gain momentum if it is made to raise revenue for development, as suggested here. 
Second, a Tobin tax can make a major revenue contribution at a much lower rate when 
it is earmarked for development than when it is implemented to stabilise exchange rates. 
This lower rate for development can ease acceptance of this financial instrument. However, 
even if a solution such as the two-tier rate structure is adopted, the tax rates remain to be 
agreed internationally. The progressive nature of the air-ticket contribution makes its 
acceptance easier. Internationally, differentiation between rates makes it possible to consider 
the specific characteristics of all countries implementing this financing mechanism, 
especially their level of development. At the same time, national tax sovereignty is not 
affected with each state adopting the tax in accordance with its own laws and constitutional 
requirements. 
Third, it remains difficult to evaluate the final distribution effects of a Tobin tax on real 
transactions whereas the air-ticket tax will have a limited economic impact on air transport, 
which is structurally very dynamic. The latter will not affect competition between air 
carriers or between the major airports. 
Fourth, whereas the implementation of a Tobin tax can be affected by specific national 
or regional capital-flow regulations and laws, the international air-ticket contribution does 
not raise legal problems. None of the international aviation convention, bilateral agreements 
and treaties prohibits the creation of such a levy on either international or domestic flights. 
Last, the Tobin tax involves an administration at a global level which requires a 
worldwide agreement. The air-ticket tax offers an alternative to global taxation as it can be 
implemented without waiting for universal participation by all countries. This point is the 
main reason why the air-ticket tax has become a reality as an innovative financing 
mechanism but the Tobin tax has not. 
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